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Abstract 
Motivated by the growing importance of research on blockchain applications, this paper conceptualizes the 
potential impact of blockchain enabled asset tokenization. Asset tokenization is the process of converting 
real-world assets to digital tokens and trading them fractionally based on a blockchain platform and its 
smart contract function. This research hypothesizes that tokenizing the asset increases its price by 
improving the democracy of the market and its liquidity, and eventually results in a price bubble, although 
it is not clear how long it will last. Furthermore, this impact is hypothesized to be greater on the previously 
lesser-known assets, because of the dominant investor sentiment and valuation subjectivity. Specifically, 
the art market is designated as a research context because blockchain applications has been expected to 
innovate the market by resolving its problems of centralization, inefficiency, and information asymmetry.  
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Introduction 
Blockchain has been referred to as a new technology that will change the entire business ecosystem and as 
a technological enabler of innovation. At first, academics and practitioners focused mainly on its role as a 
foundation for a cryptocurrency system because Satoshi Nakamoto, an anonymous entity, introduced the 
concept of Bitcoin and defined it as "an electronic cash system"(Nakamoto 2008). With Bitcoin, blockchain 
is used to store “encrypted facts,” i.e. Bitcoin transaction data, transparently and in a decentralized manner 
(Zaninotto 2016). This is how Bitcoin transactions earned their fame as secure, tamper-evident, and 
tamper-resistant. Beyond the initial cryptocurrency-based discussions, recent research has started to shed 
light on the high potential of the technology as a form of database that can handle diverse information, not 
limited to monetary assets. The main concept of this application is to bring all kinds of assets and contracts 
into a blockchain system and manage them by Smart Contracts. Smart Contract is a “system which 
automatically moves digital assets according to arbitrary pre-specified rules” (Buterin 2014) or pre-
programed conditions, taking advantage of blockchain’s programmable nature (Sanghavi et al. 2018). The 
types of assets that can be managed via a blockchain system using Smart Contracts include both digital or 
physical, tangible or intangible, and fungible or non-fungible assets (Weingärtner 2019). To be transmitted 
and traded through the distributed ledger, these assets, including their ownership, or “external promise” 
(Rosenfeld 2012), should be converted into digital tokens with a unique signature, by which a new asset 
class called “smart assets” (Sanghavi 2018), also known as “smart property”, is created (Buterin 2014). A 
token can be defined as a “representation of the physical object in the digital world” (Weingärtner 2019). 
This process is called asset tokenization. What makes asset tokenization interesting is its divisible nature. 
One unit of bitcoin can be divided up to eight decimal points or one hundred million Satoshis. Similar to 
bitcoin, altcoins and digital tokens can also be divided into smaller fractions. This allows for real-world 
assets, which were impossible to trade easily and conveniently and caused transaction illiquidity, to be 
owned in a fractional manner. Fractional ownership is a new concept of ownership and a new way to 
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transact. By this blockchain application, any network participants can share ownership of unique objects 
(Sanghavi 2018). It is important to note that the ideas of “Smart Contracts” and “Asset Tokenization” are 
not new, but they recently took form with the development of blockchain technology. 
Related Literature  
When it comes to blockchain and IS discipline, there is a research gap due to the lack of empirical, theory 
driven, and multidisciplinary research of the ramifications of blockchain systems that extend far beyond 
technological issues. There are calls for blockchain studies dealing with economic and societal domains 
(Risius and Spohrer 2017) and wider business implications (Chong et al. 2019). Furthermore, though there 
is an increasing number of blockchain-based projects and the term ‘token economy’ has gained popularity, 
there have not been enough studies on what blockchain tokens represent and their connection to underlying 
business models (Oliveira et al. 2018). Also, on asset tokenization, there are only a few studies that elucidate 
basic concepts of tokenized assets.  
Security Token and Asset Tokenization  
There are three main types of tokens. A ‘Payment and Exchange Token’ such as Bitcoin is usually called a 
‘Coin’ and is used to store value. There is also a ‘Utility Token’ that offers the rights to use and access certain 
products or services. The last and most important category for this research is a ‘Security Token.’ A ‘Security 
Token’ is a digital and tokenized version of traditional security and its value depends on the value of the 
asset, i.e. the value of the ownership, that the token is representing. Thus, it is considered as an investment 
and investors expect profits to exist. In addition, security tokens can be designed both as fungible tokens 
that are interchangeable and non-fungible tokens (NFTs) that are unique. Security tokens as NFTs are 
particularly important because they can contain unique information improving the tokenization of 
individual assets (Regner et al. 2019). Asset tokenization platforms issue tokens by security token offerings 
to secure various types of assets, from financial instruments to intellectual property, and enable their 
transactions within the platform. Because tokenized assets are based on blockchain projects, the use of 
tokens to represent physical objects not only increases the transparency of their ownership but also allows 
the division of large values into smaller units by subdivisions. Opportunities for using fractional ownership 
of illiquid, real assets via a blockchain system include the tokenization of real estate, artwork, and physical 
commodities like gold bars. For instance, in October of 2018, Elevated Returns, a real estate asset 
management company, issued a security token named “Aspen Coin” and raised $18 million for 18.9% stake 
in the St. Regis Aspen Resort. In 2015, the World Economic Forum projected that the tokenized market is 
likely to reach $24 trillion by 2027 and 10% of the world’s GDP will be tokenized and on a blockchain. 
Deloitte (2018) even contended that “tokenization could make the financial industry more accessible, 
cheaper, faster and easier, thereby possibly unlocking trillions of euros in currently illiquid assets, and 
vastly increasing the volumes of trades.” 
Effect on Value by Reducing Minimum Trading Unit  
The empirical study of Amihud et al. (1999) includes a sample of 66 stocks traded on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange whose issuing company reduced the minimum trading unit (MTU) between 1991 and 1996. The 
study found that making the stock more affordable and reducing the MTU increased a firm’s investor base, 
specifically the portion of individual investors. In fact, the average increase rate of individual shareholders 
of companies that reduced MTUs is 234%, compared to the control samples’ average of 26% increase. Aside 
from this finding, there are several empirical studies in financial research that examine the aftermath of 
MTU reduction utilizing the model of Merton. The economist, Robert C. Merton, contends that “investors 
are generally aware of only a subset of all available securities, ... and that investors can only invest in 
securities that they know about” (Merton 1987); an increase in the firm’s investor base increases its stock 
value. This assumption of the investor base is supported by empirical studies. Kadlec and McConnell (1994) 
and Foerster and Karolyi (1999) analyzed U.S. firms listed on the NYSE and non-U.S. firms listed on U.S. 
exchanges and presented empirical evidence that greater investor recognition of firms increased their share 
prices. The logic behind MTU reduction studies is that thanks to the lowered entry barrier, more investors 
recognize and hold stock; and, consequently, more problems related to information availability are resolved 
(Merton 1987). Kirchler et al. (2015) also mentioned that the “inflow” of new liquidity by new traders is 
“one of the most important ingredients of historic price bubbles”. Here, a bubble indicates status that “an 
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object is traded at high volumes at prices that are considerably at variance from intrinsic values” (King et 
al. 1993). 
Increased investor bases can also affect firm value through their impact on stock liquidity (Amihud and 
Mendelson 1986); as illiquidity is the direct result of asymmetric information problems (Kyle 1985). Also, 
it has been found that the bid-ask spread, one of the measures of illiquidity, is in a negative relationship 
with the number of shareholders (Benston and Hagerman 1974). Amihud et al. (1999) analyzes the 
phenomenon that the reduction of MTUs attracts small, individual investors who lack information and are 
liquidity- motivated. An increased portion of noise traders increases the stock liquidity and, consequently, 
the stock value (Amihud and Mendelson 1986). Therefore, it is plausible to infer that a reduction in MTUs 
increases the investor base of the stock and leads to its increased value through investor recognition and 
the increase of stock liquidity. Isaka (2014) proved that the returns for MTU reduced firms were 1.51% 
higher than those for control firms the day after the announcement of the MTU reduction, 5.33% higher 10 
trading days after, and 10.87% higher 670 trading days after.  
Investor Sentiment  
Investor sentiment can be simply defined as the propensity to speculate and investors decide their demand 
considering “the bundle of salient characteristics” of stocks and choosing the one that is compatible with 
them (Barberis and Shleifer 2003; Baker and Wurgler 2006). This means that investors with lower investor 
sentiment demand stocks that are perceived as relatively safe and stable, rather than stocks with high risk 
and high return. Similar to other behavioral factors in investment, investor sentiment has significant effects 
on stock liquidity, stock price (Liu 2015), and stock returns (Baker and Wurgler 2006). Higher investor 
sentiment is strongly associated with larger, aggressive noise trading and brings more irrational market 
makers to the market (Kyle 1985; Liu 2015). These investors are expected to be overconfident and 
significantly increase trading volumes (Odean 1998) while simultaneously lowering the price impact of the 
order flow and increasing liquidity (Liu 2015). In addition, the firms’ sensitivity toward investor sentiment 
fluctuation is reflected in stock price changes and this relationship is determined by the “subjectivity of the 
stock valuation (Baker and Wurgler 2006).” Stocks that lack an earnings history combined with the 
presence of apparently unlimited growth opportunities attract unsophisticated investors who defend a wide 
spectrum of stock valuations, as suits their sentiment. Furthermore, during a bubble period with a high 
propensity to speculate, these stocks allow investors to further argue for the high end of valuations.  
The Art Market and Blockchain Based Asset Tokenization Platform 
According to ‘The Art Market Report 2019’ issued by Art Basel and UBS, the volume of global sales in the 
art market declined by 9% in the 10-year period between 2008 and 2018 (McAndrew 2019). Two challenges 
that hinder the market from becoming more vital and fertile with new incomers and increasing trading 
volumes are considered to be correlated: illiquidity and centralization. Velthuis and Colsor (2012) analyzed 
the art market with the liquidity framework. They noted that elements such as infrequent dense market 
trading moments, high transaction costs, limited trading volume, long holding periods of artwork, 
continuously changing trends and tastes of the market and the fact that no market makers guarantee 
continuous trading of any artwork make the market illiquid. Furthermore, there is an information 
asymmetry controlled by major auction houses (Mamarbachi et al. 2008). This intense information 
asymmetry is where asset tokenization based on a distributed digital ledger can be most helpful. Besides 
illiquidity, the centralization of the market also stems from oligopolistic suppliers. The top two auction 
houses, Christie’s and Sotheby’s, held 40% of sales from the auction sector and accounted for 46% of global 
market sales in 2018. Major auction houses operate as ‘taste makers,’ restricting the number of artists and 
works that can be presented to buyers via the auction route and further promotions (Simpson 1981). This 
makes the art market a “winner-takes-all-market,” where a large fraction of expenditures is concentrated 
on a small number of artists (Prendergast 2014).  
The platform where consumers trade fractional ownership of artwork that is tokenized on blockchain is an 
emerging business model utilizing the characteristics and potential of blockchain in the art market. In July 
of 2018, Maecenas, a decentralized art investment platform, tokenized the multi-million dollar artwork of 
Andy Warhol, “14 Small Electric Chairs (1980)”. During the auction, $1.7 M was raised for 31.5% shares of 
the artwork and more than 6 million ART tokens, the Ethereum based token issued by the platform, were 
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utilized. The ART tokens can be traded in the platform in exchange for other cryptocurrencies or fiat money. 
Besides Maecenas, there are several startups working on art tokenization and the vitalization of its market.  
Hypothesis Development  
Effect on Price by Asset Tokenization  
Trading artwork, or, more precisely, its ownership, in shares by tokenizing is expected to have an impact 
similar to reduced MTU in the stock market. Reducing the volume of the “required monetary outlay” 
(Amihud et al. 1999) makes the assets more accessible with respect to both speculation motivation and non-
financial motivations. From the investment perspective, asset tokenization increases the overall investor 
base of artwork on the platform. These new-entering investors are mainly individual investors highly 
involved in noise trading (Kyle 1985) which enhances the liquidity of tokenized artwork. This is also 
significantly related to the increase of stock value (Merton 1987). However, as Merton (1987) mentioned, 
stock value also responds to the change in stock price accuracy. If the negative effect of the decreased price 
accuracy resulted by increased trading volume and volatility mitigates the positive effect of the increased 
investor base, the stock price response can also be negative (Hauser and Lauterbach 2003). Pricing accuracy 
is a proxy of price informativeness. In this study, the negative effect of price accuracy reduction caused by 
increased volatility is hypothesized to be meaningless. Pricing in the art market has been determined in a 
highly selective and subjective manner by a few taste makers. Therefore, pricing noise caused by decreased 
price accuracy and increased volatility is not as severe of a problem as it is in the stock market. In summary, 
compared with the control group, untokenized artwork which previously had almost the same properties as 
the treatment group, value of the artwork on the asset tokenization platform can be expected to be higher.  
H1(Baseline): Ceteris paribus, going through several transactions, the price of the tokenized assets will 
be higher than that of non-tokenized ones.  
Moderating Effect of Prior Awareness  
This research also proposes that the effect on price of asset tokenization(H1) will be relatively greater on 
the works of mid-career artists compared to established ones. ‘Mid-career artists’ are those who are less 
organized and whose reputation has not been fully established. They are distinct from early stage artists; 
they’ve been evaluated as having some potential to grow but it is still uncertain whether they will be selected 
by privileged taste makers and eventually become blue-chip artists whose works are highly valued. Because 
of this, the valuation of artwork in this category is expected to be more sensitive to the dominant investor 
sentiment. It is highly possible that investors of these artworks would have higher investor sentiment 
making the proportion of noise traders and irrational market makers higher in that asset's investor base 
(Kyle 1985; Liu 2015). Additionally, the increased number of investors who are overconfident about their 
own decision making will scale up the trading volumes of ‘mid-level artwork’ that leads to larger liquidity 
and higher asset prices. In conclusion, the bubble created from asset tokenization is greater with previously 
lesser known artwork than their prestigious counterpart because of their dominant investor sentiment and 
valuation subjectivity.  
H2: The effect on price by asset tokenization(H1) is negatively moderated by prior awareness of assets.  
Additionally, the more the business model of an artwork tokenization platform becomes popular, the more 
the information of the art market becomes public, being stored in a distributed digital ledger and opened 
to all market participants. This inflow of public information or information discovery could directly increase 
the demand and value of the relatively lesser knowns. The high possibility of price bubble formation and 
the quasi-long tail effect can be seen as an opportunity for some groups, but the bubble is not permanent. 
There is a definite need to hold more debates on the impact of asset tokenization. 
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